The	Centre	and	Periphery	of Conscious	Thought Mark	Fortney Journal	of	Consciousness	Studies	25	(3-4):	112-136	(2018) Approximately	9000	words. Penultimate	draft.	Please	refer	to	published	draft	for	citation. Abstract: This	paper	is	about	whether	shifts	in	attention	can	alter	what	it	is	like	to	think.	I	begin	by taking up the hypothesis that attention structures consciousness into a centre and a periphery, following	Watzl's (2014, 2017) understanding of the distinction between the centre	and	periphery	of	the	field	of	consciousness.	Then	I	show	that	introspection	leads	to divided	results	about	whether	attention	structures	conscious thought into	a	centre	and	a periphery – remarks by Martin (1997) and Phillips (2012) suggest a negative answer, whereas	remarks	by	Maher	(1923)	and	Chudnoff	(2013)	suggest	a	positive	answer.	Lastly,	I argue	that	there	is	behavioral	evidence	that	lends	weight	to	the	"yes"	side	of	the	introspective dispute.	My	argument	makes	use	of	Garavan's	(1998)	study	of	forming	and	maintaining	two mental	counts	at	once. 2 Introduction1 We	can	ask	a	wide	variety	of	interesting	questions	about	the	relationship	between	perceptual attention and	perceptual consciousness. For example,	we can ask	whether directing our perceptual	attention	towards	an	object	can	cause	our	perceptual	consciousness	of	the	object to change in certain distinctive ways.2 According to William James, the answer to that question	is	"yes".	Here	is	his	description	of	the	way	that	perceptual	attention	seems	to	alter perceptual	consciousness: ...	it	must	be	admitted	that	to	some	extent	the	relative	intensity	of	two sensations	may	be	changed	when	one	of	them	is	attended	to	and	the other	is	not...	in	listening	for	certain	notes	in	a	chord,	the	one	we	attend to	sounds	probably	a	little	more	loud	...	(James	1890	p.	425). According to	Gustav	Fechner,	however, the	answer is "no".	Here is	his	description	of the phenomenology	of	conscious	perceptual	attention: A	gray	paper	appears	to	us	no	lighter,	the	pendulum-beat	of	a	clock	no louder,	no	matter	how	much	we	increase	the	strain	of	our	attention upon	them	(in	James	1890	p.	426).3 A	great	deal	of	recent	work	in	philosophy,	psychology,	and	neuroscience	has	increased	our understanding	of	their	dispute.4	However,	I	think	that	this	recent	work	has	mostly	neglected 1	For	comments	on	this	paper,	and/or	earlier	work	that	this	paper	is	based	on,	thanks	to:	Ben	Bronner,	Diana Raffman, Eli Shupe, Gurpreet Rattan, Jill Cumby, Luke Roelofs, Nate Charlow,	Wayne	Wu,	William Seager, Zachary	Irving,	and	two	anonymous	referees	for	this	journal. 2 Throughout, I will use "consciousness" to refer to phenomenal consciousness rather than access consciousness	(see	Block	1995	for	this	distinction). 3	I	follow	Watzl	(forthcoming)	in	thinking	that	juxtaposing	these	two	quotations	is	a	useful	way	of	introducing debates	about	how	best	to	characterize	the	phenomenology	of	attending. 4	See	Wu	2014	Chapter	4	for	a	recent	review	of	some	of	these	developments	(as	well	as	positive	contributions). 3 a	closely	related	and	very	interesting	question.	The	question	is	whether	the	cognitive	kind	of attention	what	William	James	called	"intellectual	attention"	can	alter	the	phenomenology of	conscious	cognition	(James	1890	p.	419).5 In	this	paper,	I	will	answer	that	question	positively.	In	particular,	I	will	argue	that, contra	Michael	Martin	(1997)	and	Ian	Phillps	(2012),	shifts	in	intellectual	attention	can	cause some	cognitive	experiences	to	become	more	central	than	others	in	the	field	of	consciousness. In so doing, I	will	move beyond	merely introspective considerations,	which are the only considerations taken into account by Martin and Phillips, and bring some behavioral evidence	to	bear	on	the	question.	My	argument	makes	use	of	Hugh	Garavan's	(1998)	study of	forming	and	maintaining	two	mental	counts	at	once.	On	my	view,	his	study	shows	that	we can consciously and attentively think of one count while consciously and inattentively thinking	of	another	count.	Paired	with	the	assumption	that	it's	in	virtue	of	the	attentive	mode of	thought	that	an	experience	becomes	more	central	in	the	field	of	consciousness	than	other experiences	(which	I	defend	in	the	final	section	of	the	paper),	this	result	lends	some	weight to	the	claim	that	attention	can	alter	the	phenomenology	of	conscious	cognition. In distinguishing between perceptual kinds of processing and cognitive kinds of processing,	I	use	"cognitive"	to	refer	to	the	non-perceptual	kind	of	mental	processing,	and not in	the	broader	way	that it is	used	when	we	say	something like	"the	subject	matter	of cognitive science". Clearly, the subject matter of cognitive science includes perceptual processing as well as (e.g.) memorial processing. But there is also a narrower use of "cognitive". Paradigm cases of this narrower kind of cognition include deliberation, judgment,	and	memory. There	is	a	hard	question	to	ask	about	how	to	precisely	mark	the	boundary	between perception	and	this	narrower	kind	of	cognition.	In	what	follows,	by	"cognitive",	I	will	mean "stimulus-independent"	(See	Camp	2009,	Burge	2010	p.	378,	Beck	2012	p.	586,	and	Beck 5 Recently, "internal" and "reflective" have become more popular terms than "intellectual", but the psychologists	using	these	terms	say	explicitly	that	they	intend	to	mark	the	same	distinction	that	James	did	(see, e.g.	Chun,	Golomb,	and	Turk-Browne	2011	p.	77	and	Backer	and	Alain	2014	p.	439). 4 2017	for	discussion	and/or	refinement	of	this	way	of	marking	off	cognitive	processing	from perceptual	processing).	A	stimulus-independent	mental	representation	does	not	require	an active	causal	link	with	the	object	that	it	is	about	to	continue	existing.	A	visual	representation of an apple is, therefore, stimulus-dependent, while a memory of an apple is stimulusindependent. Note	that	such	a	cognitive	representation	of	the	apple	is,	in	a	sense,	dependent	on	the apple.	But	the	sense	in	which	it	is	dependent	on	the	apple	is	attenuated	and	unimportant	for our	purposes	here.	You	can't	have	a	memory	of	an	apple	without	having	perceived	the	apple first,	and	this	is	the	sense	in	which	many	cognitive	representations	ultimately	do	depend	for their existence on a stimulus. But the cognitive representation does not depend for its existence,	in	a	moment-to-moment	way,	on	an	active	causal	connection	with	the	apple.	That is	the	sense	in	which	the	cognitive	representation	is	stimulus-independent. With	those	remarks	about	cognition	on	hand	we	can	move	on	to	asking	my	question about intellectual attention and the phenomenology of conscious cognition. Just as it is plausible to assume that there is often something it is like to perceive, it is plausible to assume	that	there	is	often	something	it	is	like	to	engage	in	cognition.	6 Declan	Smithies	has helpfully provided the following list of examples of cognition that seem phenomenally conscious: • Considering	a	hypothesis • Judging	that	a	hypothesis	is	true • Recalling	a	fact	learned	in	the	past • Recognizing	that	the	conclusion	of	an	argument	follows	from	its	premises • Inferring	the	conclusion	of	an	argument	from	its	premises • Drifting	aimlessly	in	thought 6	Note	also	that	to	say	that	there	is	conscious	thought	is	not	to	make	the	presumption	that	there	is	a	sui	generis phenomenology	of	thought	(see	Pitt	2004	for	a	defense	of	such	a	view	and	Tye	&	Wright	2010	for	a	criticism	of such	a	view).	It	is	just	to	say	that	sometimes	there	is	something	it	is	like	to	engage	in	a	cognitive	process. 5 • Calculating	the	solution	to	a	problem • Deliberating	about	what	to	do • Grasping	a	metaphor • Getting	a	joke • Understanding	a	sentence • Having	an	unarticulated	thought	on	the	tip	of	your	tongue • Feeling	confident,	or	certain,	or	doubtful,	or	incredulous • Having	a	suspicion	or	a	hunch	(Smithies	2013	p.	2) Once	this	plausible	assumption	about	cognition	has	been	made	salient,	it	should	be	obvious that	we	can	ask	some	interesting	questions	about	the	way	that	attention	can	alter	these	kinds of	experiences,	and	not	just	the	perceptual	kinds	of	experiences.7 In	the	rest	of	this	paper	I	aim	to	address	one	of	those	interesting	questions	–	whether shifts	in	intellectual	attention	can	cause	some	thoughts	to	become	more	central	in	the	field of consciousness than	other thoughts. First, I articulate	my	question about attention and consciousness	a	bit	more	clearly,	and	design	a	method	to	answer	it	grounded	in	Sebastian Watzl's	(2014,	2017)	understanding	of	the	distinction	between	"centre"	and	"periphery"	in the field of consciousness. Next, I show that using this method, which is grounded in introspection,	leads	to	conflicting	results.	Finally,	I	introduce	some	behavioral	evidence	to help	us	move	past	the	introspective	deadlock.	The	evidence	in	question	is	Hugh	Garavan's (1998)	examination	of	what	happens	when	we	try	to	simultaneously	form	and	maintain	two 7	This	list	of	mental	processes	is	meant	to	give	a	rough	idea	of	the	kind	of	process	that	I	am	referring	to	when	I talk about stimulus-independent	mental processing. One consequence of thinking of cognition in terms of stimulus independence is that it categorizes the imagination as cognitive rather than perceptual, although Smithies	himself	does	not	assert	that	imagination	is	a	cognitive	process.	This	way	of	thinking	about	cognition seems	to	be	presupposed	by	psychologists	and	philosophers	in	the	recent	literature	on	cognitive	penetration and, more broadly, the demarcation between perception and cognition. Fiona MacPherson, for example, explicitly categorizes the mental states we occupy while imagining, dreaming, and hallucinating as nonperceptual	(i.e.,	presumably	cognitive)	mental	states	(Macpherson	2012	pp	50-51).	On	this	way	of	thinking, stimulus-independence is more important than phenomenal similarity or relatedness when it comes to marking the	divide	between	perception and cognition.	This approach seems to	be shared	by	psychologists including	Chun,	Golomb,	and	Turk-Browne	(2011)	and	Backer	and	Alain	(2014). . 6 mental	counts	at	once.	My	analysis	of	the	evidence,	I	argue,	gives	us	new,	additional	reason to	think	that	intellectual	attention	can	alter	the	structure	of	conscious	cognition. §1.	What	does	it	mean	for	attention	to	alter	consciousness? "There are at least two	ways to	understand the	question	of	whether a	particular	kind	of attention	alters	consciousness.	The	first	way,	as	we	saw	in	the	disagreement	between	James and	Fechner	above, amounted to	a	question	about	whether	attention	alters the	apparent qualities	of stimuli, like intensity	or loudness. In the	perceptual case, James	and	Fechner seem	to	come	to	different	introspective	judgments	about	how	to	answer	the	question. But there is also a second way of understanding the question about whether a particular	kind	of	attention	alters	consciousness.	This	second	way	amounts to	a	question about	whether	attention	alters	the	relations	that	hold	between	particular	experiences,	rather than	the	individual	experiences	themselves.	For	example,	when	we	shift	our	visual	attention to	different	crosses	on	the	figure	below,	while	our	gazes	remain	fixed	on	the	centre	cross, our	experiences	of	some	of	the	crosses	seem	to	become	more	peripheral	(or	backgrounded) than	others: , According	to	Christopher	Mole,	the	introspective	verdict	about	how	to	describe	cases	like this	one	is	less	contentious	than	the	introspective	verdict	about	the	non-structural	question about	phenomenology	that	James	and	Fechner	were	arguing	about	(2008	pp.	88-89).	On	his Figure	1:	Three	crosses 7 view,	most	people	think	that	as	we	shift	our	perceptual	attention	from	one	cross	to	another, while	keeping	our	gaze fixed	on	the	centre	cross,	perceptual	attention	does	seem	to	alter perceptual	consciousness,	in	this	structural	sense.8 Whether there is a connection between the ways we must answer these two questions	about	attention	and	consciousness	is	itself	an	open	and	interesting	question	(i.e., the	structural	question	and	then	non-structural	question).	It	might,	for	example,	be	the	case that	the	facts	about	the	structure	of	consciousness	can	explain	the	facts	about	which	objects are	presented	as	having	certain	properties	to	a	certain	degree,	or	vice	versa,	or	it	might	be that	these	sets	of	facts	are	independent	of	each	other. In	this	paper	I	restrict	the	scope	of	my	investigation	to	just	one	of	those	questions:	the question	of	whether	intellectual	attention	can	alter	conscious	cognition	in	a	structural	way. I leave open the question of whether intellectual attention to an object can alter what properties the object seems to have, and and I leave open the question of what the relationship	between	our	answers	to	those	two	questions	might	be. But before going on to actually answer the structural question about intellectual attention	and	consciousness,	I'll	discuss	in	some	more	depth	what	I	mean	when	I	say	that attention	might	alter	the	structural	features	of	consciousness. §1.1	What	is	phenomenal	structure? A	stream	of	consciousness,	as	I	use	the	term,	is	a	temporally	extended	experience	that is	itself	composed	of	experiences.	For	example,	the	experience	of	writing	a	paper	in	a	cafe might	be	composed	of	the	experience	of	feeling	the	seat	beneath	oneself,	the	experience	of tasting	coffee,	the	experience	of	coming	to	various	conclusions	about	what	to	write	next,	etc. Total conscious states are sets of experiences that are all a part of the same stream of 8	See,	however,	De	Brigarde	(2010)	and	Wu	(2014)	for	criticism	–	I	address	Wu's	method	of	criticism	in	more depth	at	the	end	of	the	paper. 8 consciousness	and	that	all	occur	at	the	same	moment.	9	A	total	conscious	state	that	is	a	part of	the	temporally	extended	experience	of	writing	a	paper	in	a	café,	for	example,	might	involve simultaneously	making	a	judgment	about	an	argument	and	hearing	some	music. Sebastian	Watzl	(2014,	2017),	among	others,	has	argued	that	consciousness	is	aptly described	as	a	"field"	of	experiences,	and	that	the	field	has	"structure".	To	be	more	precise, what	he	seems to	mean is that total conscious states are	aptly	described	as field-like.	For example,	on	this	sort	of	view,	when	you're	sitting	in	an	audience	in	front	of	an	orchestra	your field	of	experiences	will	probably	include	a	visual	experience	of	the	members	of	the	orchestra and	an	auditory	experience	of	the	piece	that	they	are	playing. Moreover,	many	of	these	philosophers	seem	to	think	that	the	field	of	experiences	has at	least	two	parts	–	a	"centre"	and	a	"periphery".	On	this	way	of	thinking,	one	experience,	or small	group	of	experiences,	can	be	said	to	be	at	the	"centre"	of	the	field	of	experiences,	while all	the	rest	of	the	experiences	can	be	said	to	be	further	out,	in	some	sense,	at	the	"periphery". Here	are	some	representative	examples	of	how	philosophers	and	psychologists	articulate the	idea	that	the	field	of	experiences	seem	to	have	this	kind	of	structure: In	most	of	our	fields	of	consciousness	there	is	a	core	of	sensation	that is very pronounced. You, for example, now, although you are also thinking	and	feeling,	are	getting	through	your	eyes	sensations	of	my face and figure, and through	your ears sensations of	my	voice. The sensations are the centre or focus, the thoughts and feelings the margin,	of	your	actually	present	conscious	field.	(James	1890	p.	18) Perhaps the best general description of the effect of attention is afforded by Wundt's comparison of consciousness to the field of vision. As in the eye there is a point of clearest vision, where all impressions are very distinct as opposed to the vagueness of the 9	I	follow	James	(1890)	in	this	use	of	"stream	of	consciousness"	and	Bayne	(2010)	in	this	use	of	"total	conscious state". 9 objects	seen	with	other	parts	of	the	retina,	so	in	the	mind	there	are always	a	few	processes	which	stand	out	clearly	while	the	others	are blurred	and	indefinite...	Attention	may	wander	over	the	mental	field as	the	eye	may	wander	over	a	surface	in	the	outside	world.	(Pillsbury 1907	p.	2) It	might	be	helpful if I	were to give some	more	definite idea	of the manner	in	which	I	conceive	a	thought	or	an	element	of	consciousness to	occupy	the	foreground	of	consciousness...	When	speaking	about	an object	in	the	vicinity	it	is	usually	possible	to	point	to	it.	The	visual	field, the	auditory	field,	or	whatever	sense-field	it is, then	organizes	itself about	the	object. It	becomes	the	centre	of	attention.	Very	much	of	a parallel	situation	is	found,	I	suggest,	in	consciousness	generally.	When I have a thought, for instance, the thought becomes the cognitive referent	around	which	consciousness	organizes	itself.	(Evans	1970	p. 91) ...	imagine	you	are	in	a	room	with	dark	gray	walls,	ceiling,	and	floor and a single source of dim	overhead light. In that room is sitting a cushion	and	a	small	table.	On	the	table	is	a	steaming	pot	of	tea.	Imagine that	you	are	sitting	on	the	cushion	facing	the	teapot	with	your	eyes open,	fixated	on	the	teapot,	breathing	steadily	and	slowly.	To	yield	the phenomenal	contrast,	imagine	that	you	are	interested	in	observing	the steam	from	the	pot	of tea. In the	second	version	of this	experience, imagine that you are interested in observing your breath, as in a session of yogic meditation.... I suspect that most experience the stimulus	of interest to	be in the foreground	when interested in the steam,	and	the	breath	in	the	foreground	when	interested	in	the	breath. This	is	not	to	say	that	most	people	experience	the	stimulus	of	interest to	be	in	the	spatial	foreground;	the	stimulus	of	interest	is	experienced as	though	in	the	foreground	of	the	mind.	(Jennings	2015	p.	1268). 10 As	these	passages	demonstrate,	the	view	that it is	correct	to	describe	parts	of	the	field	of consciousness	as	more	central	than	others	is	a	popular	and	enduring	one. Sebastian	Watzl's	account	of	the	distinction	between	centre	and	periphery	seems	to be the	most extensive and explicit, and so in what follows I will work	with his view in particular (his account is developed in	Watzl 2010,	Watzl 2011a,	Watzl 2014, and	Watzl 2017).	Here	is	what	Watzl	has	to	say	about	what	makes	one	experience	"further"	from	the centre	of	the	field	of	consciousness	than	another	experience: The idea that the field	of consciousness	has	attentional structure is highly	intuitive.	When	I	focus	attention	on	an	itch	there	seems	to	be	a sense in which the itch experience is central in the field of consciousness,	while the feeling of elevation, the experience of the jazz,	and	the	experience	of	the	letters	become	a	mere	periphery	to	that central	experience.	By	contrast,	when	I	start	focusing	on	the	melody being	played	by	the	saxophone, the itch	experience	moves	from	the centre to the fringe or margin of my field of consciousness. (Watzl	2014	p.	65) So	according	to	Watzl's	introspective	observations,	when	we	consciously	focus	our	attention on	one	thing	and	then	another,	what	it	is	like	to	be	us	seems	to	change	in	a	distinctive	and systematic	way.	Our	experiences	of	what	we focus	our	attention	on	seem	to	move to the centre	of	the	field	of	experiences,	and	our	experiences	of	many	other	things	that	we	were already	experiencing	seem	to	move	further	from	the	centre. To put things a bit more precisely, Watzl thinks that a particular phenomenal property	–	"being	in	the	centre	of	the	field	of	experiences"	–	is	to	be	explained	with	reference to	various	instances	of	a	particular	phenomenal	relation	–	the	"peripheral-to"	relation	(Watzl 2014 p. 66). On his view, the centre of the field of experiences is the experience (or experiences) that are not peripheral to any other experiences. Additionally, on his view, 11 one's "object of attention" is the object that the experience at the centre of the field of experiences	is	about	(Watzl	2010	p.	150,	2014	p.	67). Watzl's	account	of	the	peripheral-to	relation	generates,	therefore,	a	method	of	trying to	find	out	whether	a	shift	in	a	particular	kind	of	attention	(e.g.	perceptual	or	intellectual) can	cause	the	structure	of	part	of	the	field	of	experiences	to	change.	The	method	is	this:	you deliberately shift the direction of either variety of attention, and then you ask yourself questions of the form: "Did that series of experiences reveal to	me that the shift of my attention	altered	the	structure	of	my	field	of	consciousness?".	If	"yes"	seems	to	be	the	answer, one	can	then	move	to	conclusions	of	the	form	"Well	then:	directing	that	kind	of	attention	can change	the	structure	of	the	field	of	experiences". Reflection	on	Watzl's	case	above	seems	to	generate	the	conclusion	that	perceptual attention	can	alter the	structure	of the	perceptual	part	of the field	of	consciousness.	This conclusion is also in line with Mole's articulation of the common-sense picture of the relationship	between	attention	and	consciousness,	which	I	discussed	above. In	the	next	section,	I	attempt	to	apply	this	methodology	to	answering	my	question about	intellectual	attention	and	conscious	cognition.	As	we'll	see,	there's	a	problem:	on	the basis	of	introspection,	Michael	Martin	(1997)	and	Ian	Phillips	(2012)	would	answer	"no",	but Michael	Maher	(1923)	and	Elijah	Chudnoff	(2013)	would	answer	"yes". §2.	Introspecting	on	the	structure	of	conscious	cognition If	we	think	of	the	field	of	experiences	as	a	set	of	experiences,	it	is	easy	to	talk	about parts	of	the	field.	Parts	of	the	field	are	subsets	of	the	set	of	experiences	that	constitutes	the field.	In	fact,	I've	already	mentioned	two	parts	of	the	field	in	this	paper:	the	centre	and	the periphery.	Another	interesting	part	of	the	field	of	experiences	is	the	cognitive	part	of	the	field 12 –	that	is,	the	part	composed	of	the	experiences	that	you	have	when	you	engage	in	cognitive activities	like	judging	and	remembering. We should expect the methodology I discussed above to enable us to answer questions	about	the	centres	of	parts	of	the	field	of	experiences,	just	as	we	should	expect	it	to answer	questions about the centre	of the field	as	a	whole.	Here's the	particular	question about	a	part	of	the	field	of	experience	that	I'm	interested	in	addressing	in	this	paper:	"Can the	way	we	direct	our	intellectual	attention	structure	our	cognitive	experiences	into	a	centre and	a	periphery?	Or	are	all	of	our	cognitive	experiences	equally	central?".	Note	that	precisely what it	means for attention to "structure" experience into a centre and a periphery	will depend on what the metaphysical relationship between attention and consciousness consists	in.	If	attention	is	something	distinct	from	consciousness	(as	it	is	according	to,	e.g. Wu	2014)	then	my	question	is	about	the	causal	impact	that	intellectual	attention	can	have on	consciousness. If	attention	is	an	aspect	or	mode	of	consciousness, then	my	question	is about	how	that	aspect	or	mode	of	consciousness	alters	as	we	engage	in	shifts	of	attention. In	the	rest	of	this	section,	I'll	review	some	answers	that	philosophers	have	given	to this	question	on	the	basis	of	introspection	(i.e.,	the	method	suggested	by	Watzl's	remarks	on the	centre	and	periphery	of	the	field	of	consciousness). Michael Martin and Ian Phillips have given introspective reports in favour of a negative	answer	to	the	question	of	whether	intellectual	attention	seems	to	alter	the	structure of	conscious	cognition,	but	their	treatment	of	the	question	was	relatively	brief.	Martin's	and Phillips's claim	actually	occurs	within	an	argument	about	a separate	debate	– the	debate about	how	best	define	or	otherwise	give	an	account	of	intellectual	attention.	They	think	that intellectual attention constitutes cognitive consciousness, while perceptual attention structures	perceptual	consciousness.10 10	An	even	deeper	problem	with	their	view	is	that	it	seems	to	rule	out	the	possibility	of	unconscious	intellectual attention from the start. But this is an unacceptable result, given the widespread presumption that it is intelligible to search for empirical evidence that unconscious attention exists – see e.g. Kentridge (2011), Norman,	Heywood,	&	Kentridge	(2013),	and	Mole	(2014). 13 This	is	their	argument	in	favour	of	accepting	that	way	of	distinguishing	perceptual attention	from	intellectual	attention	(Martin	1997	p.	78;	Phillips	2012	p.	288): (1)	Initial	reflection	on	ordinary	perceptual	experiences	shows	that	it seems to be the case that	we are currently having experience of a plenitude of items beyond what we are currently focusing our attention	on. (2)	Initial	reflection	on	ordinary	cognitive	experiences	seems	to	show that	there	is	no	such	array	of	items	for	us	to	shift	our	attention	across. (3)	Therefore	we	can	distinguish	between	perceptual	and	intellectual attention	in	the	following	way:	perceptual	attention	is	a	modification of	the	perceptual	stream	of	consciousness,	but intellectual	attention just	is	the	cognitive	stream	of	consciousness. (1)	is	relatively	uncontroversial.	As	Christopher	Mole	(2008)	argues, introspective reflection on day-to-day perceptual experiences seems to reveal that the relationship between	perceptual	attention	and	perceptual	consciousness	is	as	of	a	spotlight	of	attention ranging	over	field	of	experiences	of	which	one	is	already	conscious.	Above,	I	used	a	figure with	three	crosses	to	help	illustrate	Mole's	point. But	(2),	I	will	argue,	is	more	controversial	than	Martin	and	Phillips	seem	to	think.	This is	how	they	describe	what	their	own	conscious	cognition	seems	to	be	like	when	they	argue in	favour	of	(2): [P]erceptual attention seems to range over an array of objects of which	we	are	already	aware.	Internal	attention	does	not	range	over contents, some	of	which	were	already	objects	of thought...	(Phillips 2012	p.	288). 14 In	[the	perceptual	case]	it	is	tempting	to	think	of	experience	in	terms of	a	whole	array	of	items	stretching	beyond	what	I	have	focused	my attention	on	at	a	time	an	array	over	which	I	could	move	my	attention, as	a	beam	or	a	spotlight.	It	is	as	if	I	am	aware	of	the	whole	array	at	a time ...	whether I	now	focus	my	attention	on	one	part	of it	or	not ... There seems to be no corresponding array of items to shift one's attention	over	in	thought...	(Martin	1997	p.	78). So	Martin	and	Phillips	seem	to	think	that	structure	plays	less	of	a	role	in	conscious	cognition. That	is,	they	seem	endorse	(2)	because	they	think	that	all	of	our	cognitive	experiences	seem to	be	in	the	focus	of	attention.	On	this	way	of	thinking,	all	of	our	cognitive	experiences	are equally	central,	and	consequently	shifts	in	attention	would	not	cause	shifts	in	the	way	that the	peripheral-to	relation	obtains	in	a	given	subject's	field	of	experiences. (2)	would	be	undermined	if	other	theorists	have	come	to	different	conclusions	about what	cognitive	experience	seems	to	be	like,	and	indeed,	other	theorists	have	come	to	that kind	of conclusion. For example,	Elijah	Chudnoff has claimed that the	phenomenology	of performing a geometrical proof can involve having some cognitive experiences in the foreground	of	consciousness	and	some	in	the	background: You	consider	the	proposition	that	circles	are	symmetrical	about	their diameters...	What	you	do	is	imagine	an	arbitrary	circle,	and	imagine folding it over various chords that divide it into equal parts. These chords are its diameters, and it is clear from your imaginative endeavor	that	the	circle	is	symmetrical	about	them...	In	[this	case]	you differentiate the	property	of	being	a	diameter from its	background. This background consists of other	properties...	To say that you are thinking	about	all	the	different	sorts	of	chords	on	a	circle	is	not	to	say that	each	one	stands	out	clearly	before	your	mind.	Only	one	does:	the diameter	(Chudnoff	2013,	pp.	717-718). 15 On	Chudnoff's	view,	therefore,	thinking	about	something	does	not	entail	that	it	is	an	object of	our	intellectual	attention: it	might	be	in	the	background	of	cognitive	consciousness.	An alternative	explanation	of	this	apparent	dispute	between	Martin	and	Phillips	and	Chudnoff is	that	Chudnoff	is	describing	an	episode	of	visual	imagination,	which	is	not	a	process	that	is "cognitive" in the sense that	Martin and Phillips intended. This gives us some reason to investigate	the	phenomenology	of	cognitive	processes	that	are	more	obviously	cognitive	in the	sense	that	they	intended,	as	I	do	below	in	my	discussion	of	the	phenomenology	of	forming and	maintaining	mental	counts. And	here	is	a	second	description	of	the	phenomenology	of	thought	that	problematizes (2),	from	Michael	Maher's	book	Psychology:	Empirical	and	Rational: ... intellectual attention, even when engaged in comparison, apprehends	its	objects	in	the	form	of	a	unity	of	some	sort.	The	focus	of attention seems to	be at any	moment a single thought, though that thought may carry a fringe of relations and a nucleus of elements dimly	felt	to	be	distinct	from	each	other...	(Maher	1923	p.	349). Maher seems to think any attentive cognitive experience we have is accompanied by a "fringe"	which is felt in	a	different	way than the thought that	we	are	attending to.	And it seems	plausible	to	suggest	that	various	parts	of	this	fringe	are	items	that	we	could	direct intellectual attention towards, and cause to become more central in our fields of consciousness.	So	on	Maher's	way	of thinking, there	does seem	to	be	an	array	of items in conscious	thought	that	attention	can	range	over. Maher	and	Chudnoff	may	well	be	wrong	about	what	the	phenomenology	of	conscious thought	is	like.	My	goal	in	quoting	their	introspective	reports	is	just	making	it	evident	that Martin's	and	Phillips's	argument	is	much	more	controversial	than	it	might	first	appear,	and that	in	fact	there	are	theorists	who	would	dispute	their	claim	about	the	phenomenology	of conscious	thinking. 16 The core problem is that introspective judgments about how to characterize phenomenology	notoriously	vary	from	person	to	person.11	Thus,	these	initial	moves	based on	introspection	doesn't	seem	sufficient	to	answer	my	question	about	whether	intellectual attention	alters	cognitive	consciousness,	or	to	provide	Martin	and	Phillips	adequate	reason to distinguish perceptual attention from intellectual attention in the way that they do. Martin's	and	Phillips's	argument	for	their	definition	of	intellectual	attention	seems	to	rest	on the	hope	that	this	particular	introspective	judgment	will	not	be	variable	in	that	way,	but,	as I've	shown,	this	introspective	judgment	is	variable	in	just	that	way. For	all	that,	(2)	might	be	true.	One	way	to	make	some	headway	would	be	to	make	some more	sophisticated	introspective	arguments	–	e.g.,	to	provide	a	debunking	argument	for	the introspective judgments of either Martin and Phillips or Maher and Chudnoff. Such an argument	would	provide	an	explanation	of	why	one	of	the	pairs	of	philosophers	is	incorrectly describing the phenomenology of their own conscious cognition. Another potential	way would	be	to	attempt	to	make	use	of	introspective	data	from	specially	trained	subjects	rather than	relatively	naïve	subjects.12 Alternatively,	another	way	to	make	some	progress	on	the	question	of	whether	(2)	is true would be to advert to some behavioral or neurological evidence. Behavioral or neurological	evidence	that	there	were	two	modes	of	consciously	thinking	(one	attentive,	the other inattentive) would lend some weight to the conclusions of Maher and Chudnoff. Behavioral or neurological evidence to the contrary would lend some weight to the conclusions	of	Martin	and	Phillips. In	the	next	section	of	this	paper,	I	investigate	the	option	of	moving	this	debate	forwards with	behavioral	evidence. 11	See,	e.g.,	Schwitzgebel	(2008)	for	a	vivid	discussion	of	this	point,	as	well	as	a	discussion	of	introspection's (un)reliability. 12	See,	e.g.,	Schwitzgebel	(2004)	and	Heavey,	Hurlburt,	and	Lefforge	(2010)	for	discussions	of	what	that	sort	of training	might	entail.	The	training involves learning	to	use	specific terms	to	describe	what it is like	to	have various	specific	kinds	of	experiences. 17 §3.	How	to find	behavioural	evidence	that there is	structure in	conscious	cognition I think it's reasonable to	assume that theorists in	both	camps	of this	dispute	would accept	the	claim	that	we	can	consciously	think	of	more	than	one	thing	at	once.	What	Martin and	Phillips	take	issue	with	is	the	claim	that	in	so	doing	we	could	also	think	attentively	about one of them and inattentively about the other. So the kind of evidence that would be compelling	to	Martin	and	Phillips,	or	someone	who	agrees	with	them	about	how	to	describe the	phenomenology	of	conscious	cognition,	would	be	some	non-introspective	evidence	that we	can	attentively	think	of	one	thing	while	inattentively	thinking	of	another.	Paired	with	the assumption	that	it's	in	virtue	of	the	attentive	mode	of	thought	an	experience	becomes	more central	in	the	field	of	consciousness	than	others	(which	I	defend	in	the	final	section	of	the paper),	that	result	would	corroborate	the	introspective	judgments	of	Maher	and	Chudnoff. Hugh Garavan's paper "Serial Attention	Within	Working	Memory" (1998) provides some behavioral evidence that will help us answer my question. In Garavan's study, participants formed and maintained two counts at the same time. Participants were informed	of	their	two	tasks	keeping	count	of	the	triangles	and	rectangles	that	they	saw	and then	exposed	to	one	shape	(a	triangle	or	a	rectangle)	at	a	time.	Participants	controlled when	they	were	exposed	to	the	next	shape	in	the	series	by	pressing	a	bar	as	soon	as	they	had updated	their	count	(i.e.,	they	had	control	of	the	"stimulus	onset"	time). There	were	two	kinds	of	transitions	between	shape-slides	within	the	series	of	shapeslides. In	a "No	Stimulus	Switch" transition,	a	rectangle followed	a	rectangle	or	a triangle followed	a triangle. In	a "Stimulus	Switch" transition,	a rectangle followed	a triangle	or	a triangle	followed	a	rectangle.	I've	included	my	illustration	of	this	below:	transition	#1	is	a "No Stimulus Switch" transition, while transitions #2, #3, and #4 are "Stimulus Switch" transitions.	On	my	way	of	speaking,	a	transition	is	the	duration	between	two	stimulus	onset times. 18 Garavan	found that participants	took	longer	to	respond	to	two	slides	in	a	"Stimulus	Switch"	transition	than	in	a "No	Stimulus	Switch"	transition.	His	explanation	of	the	delay	was	that	participants	were	only able	to	attend	to	one	count	at	a	time,	and	that	in	order	to	update	their	count	in	the	"Stimulus Switch"	condition,	participants	first	had	to	switch	their	focus	of	attention	to	a	different	count than	the	one	that	they	were	already	attending	to	(Garavan	1998	p.	271).	Garavan	performed additional experiments to rule out other perceptual explanations of the delay e.g., the explanation	that	the	delay	occurred	because	it	is	easier	to	focus	one's	gaze	on	two	triangles consecutively	than	a	triangle	and	then	a	rectangle	(Garavan	1998	pp.	267-268).	In	short,	this effect	does	not	seem	to	be	a	purely	perceptual	phenomenon,	and	so	our	explanation	of	why it	occurred	needs	to	advert	to	cognition. Garavan	also	argued	that	an	explanation	that	adverted	to	a	shift	in	attention	was	more plausible	than	one	that	adverted	to	retrieval	from	memory.	As	he	points	out,	over	the	course of the study participants	would verbalize both of their counts in the same order. But in Stimulus	Switch	transitions,	the	delay	persisted	even	when	the	count	that	the	participant	had to	switch	to	was	the	count	that	they	had	most	recently	rehearsed.	He	has	in	mind,	e.g.,	the following	sequence	of	events:	the	presentation	of	a	square,	a	participant	verbalizing	their count	of	squares	and	then	their	count	of	triangles,	the	presentation	of	a	triangle,	and	then the	participant	verbalizing	their	count	of	squares	and	count	of	triangles.	As	Garavan	notes, "one	would	expect	the	retrieval	of	[the	most	recently	rehearsed]	count's	current	value	to	be Figure	3:	Garavan's	experiment 19 at least	as	fast	as, if	not	faster	than,	retrieval	of	the	just	updated	count"	(Garavan	1998	p. 273).	But	this	is	not	what	he	observed,	and	the	Stimulus	Switch	delay	persisted	even	when	a count	had	been	recently	rehearsed. But	why should	we really think that this explanation should advert to intellectual attention rather than some other non-memorial aspect of cognition? This brings us to challenging	question	of	what the	nature	of	attention	really is,	and	the	related	question	of what	counts	as	behavioral	evidence	that	a	participant	has	directed	her	attention	to	one	thing and then another. See Anderson 2011 Watzl 2011b for discussion of the problem of widespread disagreement amongst psychologists and philosophers about how to define "attention".	Anderson's	concern	that	most	psychologists	studying	attention	are	actually	all studying	something	different	is	aptly	expressed	in	the	title	of	his	2011	paper,	"There	is	no such	thing	as	attention".	And	Garavan,	like	many	psychologists	working	on	attention,	did	not explicitly	define "attention" in	his article. Instead,	he seemed to rely	on the idea that the process	he	was	studying	seemed	to	be	a	paradigm	case	of	intellectual	attention. I	agree	with	Garvan's	assumption,	and	here	will	provide	an	argument	for	it	grounded in	Wayne	Wu's	(2014)	analysis	of	the	way	many	psychologists	study	perceptual	attention. First	I'll	explain	Wu's	view	and	how	it	applies	to	the	intellectual	case,	and	then	I'll	explain how	we	can	use	his	view	to	defend	the	idea	that	Garavan's	task	required	shifts	of	intellectual attention. Wu's view is	designed to address the	problem	of apparent	disagreement amongst psychologists about what perceptual attention really is. He acknowledges that many psychologists appear to define "perceptual attention" differently. But, he argues, many psychologists	seem	to	think	that	when	a	participant	uses	information	from	a	personal	level perceptual representation to guide the performance of some task, she has perceptually attended	to	the	object	that	the	representation	is	about.	This	view	is	based	on	Wu's	analysis of	how	a	wide	variety	of	psychologists	make	inferences	about	perceptual	attention,	including psychologists studying attention via the visual search paradigm and the shadowing paradigm	(Wu	2014	p.	39) 20 Wu's analysis reveals that although many psychologists studying perceptual attention	might	appear to use the	word "perceptual attention" in different	ways, a large group	of	them	are	actually	all	using	the	word	in	the	same	way	when	it	really	matters	(i.e., when	drawing	conclusions	about	attention	on	the	basis	of	observed	behavior).	As	Wu	notes, realizing that a variety of psychologists endorse such a view	about	what is sufficient for attention	goes	along	with	being	able to	explain	why	we	should	resist the	skepticism	that some	psychologists	have	about	the	progress	of	our	collective	study	of	attention.	Moreover, on	this	way	of	thinking,	there	might	be	both	conscious	and	unconscious	attention:	when	the representation in question is conscious, the participants' use of information would be sufficient for conscious attention, and when the representation is unconscious, the participants'	use	of	information	would	be	sufficient	for	unconscious	attention.13 Suppose	that	Wu	is	right	about	how	many	psychologists	study	perceptual	attention. Then	it	would	be	reasonable	to	hypothesize	that	psychologists	studying	intellectual	attention believe	that	a	similar	kind	of	behaviour	is	sufficient	reason	to	conclude	that	a	participant	has intellectually attended to an object. On this way of thinking, what would suffice for intellectual	attention	to	an	object is that	a	subject	uses information	from	a	personal level cognitive	representation	of	the	object	to	guide	the	performance	of	a	task. The way that psychologists study intellectual attention using the "refreshing paradigm"	provides	support for this	hypothesis. In the	simplest	version	of the	refreshing paradigm, subjects see a series of words on slides, one at a time, interspersed	with the occasional	slide	that	displays	a	single	black	dot.	They	are	instructed	to	read	aloud	the	words that	they	see,	and	to	think	of	("refresh")	and	say	the	previous	word	they	saw	when	they	see 13	That	idea	seems	to	make	sense	of	why,	e.g.	Kentridge	(2011),	Norman,	Heywood,	&	Kentridge	(2013),	and Mole	(2014)	say	that	when	a	subject	uses	information	from	a	representation	of	some	object	but	doesn't	seem conscious	of	it,	there	is	evidence	in	favour	of	the	view	that	unconscious	attention	exists.	The	subjects	they	have in	mind	are	subjects	with	blindsight	using	information	from	representations	of	objects	in	their	blind	fields,	or sighted subjects that use information from representations of objects that are "invisible" because of their rapidly	flickering	boundaries	(see	Mole	2014	p.	45	for	more	on	"invisible"	objects). 21 a	black	dot.	Here	is	an	example	of	what	a	series	of	slides	in	the	refreshing	paradigm	look	like: Figure 1: The refreshing paradigm Psychologists	seem	to	think	that	when	subjects	successfully	respond	to	the	black	dots,	the subjects have attended to the previous word that they saw.14 The hypothesis that they believe that using information from a personal level and cognitive representation of an object	to	guide	the	performance	of	a	task	seems	to	explain	why	they	make	this inference. That's because in this paradigm, subjects must have used information from cognitive representations of the previous word they had seen to guide their performance of the "respond	to	a	black	dot"	task. Psychologists	that	study	intellectual	attention	via	the	refreshing	paradigm,	therefore, seem to think of attention in just the way that Wu argued that psychologists studying perceptual	attention	do.	It's	also	the	case	that	scientists	working	in	other	paradigms,	like	the "n-back"	paradigm	and	the	"retro-cue"	paradigm,	appear	to	think	of	intellectual	attention	in terms of using information from cognitive representations to guide the performances of tasks,	but	I	do	not	discuss	those	paradigms	in	this	paper	for	brevity's	sake	(see	McElree	2006 for	a	look	at	the	n-back	paradigm	and	Astle	et	al.	2012	for	a	look	at	the	retro-cue	paradigm). 14	See	Johnson	et	al.	(2002	p.	64)	for	this	task,	and	Johnson	et	al.	(2005	p.	340)	for	the	explicit	assertion	that 'refreshing'	(which is	required	by	responding	to	the	dot)	entails	attention.	For	more	work	in	the	refreshing paradigm	see, e.g.,	Raye	et al. (2002),	Chen	&	Cowan (2009),	Higgins	& Johnson (2009), and Johnson	et al. (2013). 22 Now	I'll	argue	that	if	we	use	this	view	about	what's	sufficient	for	intellectual	attention to	analyze	the	methodology	in	Garvan's	study	of	mental	counting,	we	get	the	result	that	we should expect: in	Garavan's study, participants had to switch their conscious intellectual attention	from	one	count	to	another	throughout	his	experiment. First,	note	that	in	this	experiment,	participants	working	through	the	two	slides	of	a Stimulus	Switch	transition	had	to	use information from	one	cognitive	representation	of	a count and then another cognitive representation of a count in order to guide their performances	of	their	two	counting	tasks.	The	reason	that	the	representations	in	question seem cognitive is because their existence is doesn't actively depend on any particular stimulus	–	indeed,	the	point	of	these	representations	is	to	track	information	about	several stimuli that are only ever briefly perceptually available (and some that are never perceptually	available	–	the	counts	themselves). Second,	note	that	participants	working	through	the	two	slides	of	a	Stimulus	Switch transition	had to	use information from	one	conscious	representation	of	a	count	and then another	conscious	representation	of	a	count	in	order	to	guide	their	performances	of	their two	counting	tasks.	The	representations	in	question	seem	conscious	because,	throughout	the procedure,	as	participants	updated	any	individual	count,	they	verbally	reported	the	current values	of	both	counts: "As previously described for Experiment 1, when asked to count aloud,	all	subjects	adopted	the	technique	of	verbalizing	both	counts following	each figure, that is, subjects	would	update	one count and rehearse	the	current	value	of	the	other	count.	For	convenience,	these different	operations	will	be	referred	to	as	"updating"	and	"rehearsing." (Garavan	1998	p.	10) I take this kind of capacity to describe some of the content of a representation via introspection	to	be	a	good	(although	defeasible)	reason	to	think	that	the	representation	in 23 question	is	a	conscious	one.	It	seems	phenomenologically	implausible	to	suggest	that	while verbally	reporting	on	their	counts	the	participants	were	using	unconscious	representations to	guide	their	actions,	in	the	way	that	a	person	with	blindsight,	forced	to	guess	about	where a	nearby	object is located,	uses information from	an	unconscious	representation	to	guide their	actions.	When	we	form	and	update	two	mental	counts	at	once,	it	does	not	feel	like	we are	being	guided	by	an	unconscious	state	or	retrieving	something	from	memory. But it is possible to press this point: after all, even if it seems as though	we are conscious	of	both	counts throughout,	we	might	be	mistaken	about that. Perhaps, in fact, participants	are	only	ever	conscious	of	the	count	that	they	are	updating,	and	that	the	count that	they	are	not	updating	is	stored	in	memory	and	consequently	unconscious.	If	might	be argued	that	one	count	"moves"	to	long	term	memory	and	thereby	becomes	unconscious. However, the example of H.M., a famous patient in the history of psychology and neuroscience,	suggests	otherwise.	As	a	result	of	a	lesion,	H.M	lost	the	capacity	to	form	new long-term	memories,	but	retained	the	capacity	to	acquire	new	skills	and	engage	in	day-today	tasks.	Crucially,	the	day-to-day	tasks	he	was	able	to	perform	seem	to	include	tasks	that are	very	much	like	the	mental	counting	task	at	issue	in	Garavan's	study	–	see	this	passage from	Larry	Squire's	paper	"The	Legacy	of	Patient	H.M.	for	Neuroscience": "A	key	additional	finding	was	that	H.M.	had	a	remarkable	capacity	for sustained	attention, including the	ability to	retain information for	a period of time after it was presented. Thus, he could carry on a conversation,	and	he	exhibited	an	intact	digit	span	(i.e.,	the	ability	to repeat back a string of six or seven digits). Indeed, information remained available so long as it could be actively maintained by rehearsal...	In	contrast,	when	the	material	was	not	easy	to	rehearse	(in the case of nonverbal stimuli like faces or designs), information slipped	away	in	less	than	a	minute."	(Squire	2009	p.	7) 24 What	H.M.'s capacities suggests is that the rehearsal strategy that	Garavan's	participants engaged	in	was	not	a	strategy	that	was	enabled	by	the	use	of	storing	a	count	in	long-term memory.	As	Squire	notes,	it	seems	like	in	H.M.	long-term	memory	was	damaged	but	what William James called "primary memory" was preserved, and that H.M.'s use of primary memory is what explains his success in performing day to day tasks like carrying on a conversation or rehearsing some digits. James said that information presented to us via primary	memory	"comes	to	us	as	belonging	to	the	rearward	portion	of	the	present	space	of time,	and	not	to	the	genuine	past",	whereas	"secondary	memory	is	quite	different. An	object which	has	been	recollected	is	one	which	has	been	absent	from	consciousness	altogether,	and now	revives	anew. It is	brought	back,	recalled, fished	up,	so	to	speak, from	a	reservoir in which,	with	countless	other	objects,	it	lay	buried	and	lost	from	view".	(James,	1890,	p.	647648). These two points, combined with Garavan's observation that Stimulus Switch transitions took	more time than	no stimulus switch transitions, show that	during such a moment, the	participants	were consciously thinking	of both counts, but only consciously attending to one of the counts. Paired with the assumption that attention structures consciousness	into	a	centre	and	periphery	(which	I	defend	in	the	next	section	of	the	paper), we	get the	result that the	peripheral-to	relation	can	obtain in	conscious	cognition,	contra Martin's	and	Phillips's	descriptions	of	the	phenomenology	of	conscious	cognition. §5.	Do	shifts	in	conscious	attention	always	accompany	structural	change? As	I've	remarked	a	few	times	above,	I've	assumed	that	shifts	in	attention	come	along with	alterations	to	the	structure	of	consciousness.	Someone	with	intuitions	like	Martin's	and Phillips's	could	maintain	their	view	of	the	phenomenology	of	conscious	cognition	through arguing that although we can consciously and attentively think of one thing while consciously	and inattentively thinking	of	another, it's	not the	case that	shifts in	attention necessarily	cause	one	experience	to	become	more	central	than	another	one.	So	far,	in	this paper	I've	only	provided	an	argument	for	the	former	claim,	and	not	the	latter	one. 25 As	we	saw	earlier	in	the	paper,	the	latter	claim	is	widely	endorsed	by	many	theorists that	talk	about	attention.	Early	psychologists	like	William	James	and	David	Pillsbury,	and	a variety	of	philosophers	including	Cedric	Owen	Evans,	Sebastian	Watzl,	and	Carolyn	Jennings, have	all	claimed	that	(i)	shifts	in	conscious	attention	seems	to	alter	consciousness	and	that (ii) the language	of centrality should	be	used to	characterize this	alteration.	Their claims seem	grounded	in	introspection,	and	I	agree	with	them	about	the	introspective	verdict	here. These	claims	are	not,	however,	undisputed.	Wayne	Wu,	for	example,	has	this	to	say about	the	phenomenal	effects	of	conscious	attention: In discussing phenomenal salience, I suggested that the phenomenology	of	attention	is	a	product	of	very	special	cases	where one	reflects	on	attention	and	its	targets.	In	reflecting	in	this	way,	one focuses on the targets, although in a way that need not involve a change	in	the	phenomenology	of	experience	per	se...	Watzl	might	be right	that	there	is	something	like	a	center-periphery	structure,	but	I claim	that	this	is	a	reflection	of	special	cases.	Alternatively,	Watzl	can claim that I have simply	missed a common structural feature of all perceptual	experiences	where	attention	is	differentially	deployed.	At this	point,	the	debate	mirrors	something	like	the	exchange	between James and Fechner, a difference in basic intuitions about the phenomenology	of	attention.	The	challenge	then	is	how	to	resolve	the impasse when one hits rock-bottom disagreements about how consciousness	seems	to	be.	(Wu	2014	p.	130). On	Wu's view, attention only sometimes results in phenomenal changes, and the language of centrality is	not the right language to characterize the changes that shifts in attention	sometimes	do	explain.	As	Wu	notes, it is	difficult	to	know	how	to	resolve	"rockbottom	disagreements"	like	this	one. 26 That being said, I think that it is reasonable to think that	Wu's description of the phenomenology	of	attention	is	something	of	an	anomaly,	and	to	side	with	theorists	on	the other	side	of	this	dispute	–	theorists	like	William	James,	David	Pillsbury,	Cedric	Owen	Evans, Sebastian	Watzl, and Carolyn Jennings, who all seem to describe the phenomenology of attention	in	convergent	ways. Moreover,	the	fact	that	Wu	is	such	an	outlier	is	not	the	only	reason	to	side	with	James, Pillsbury,	Evans,	Watzl,	and	Jennings	It	also	seems	epistemically	significant	that	this	range	of theorists,	from	a	wide	array	of	differing	intellectual	vantage	points	–	i.e.,	from	a	wide	range of times, places, and theoretical backgrounds – have described the phenomenology of attention in	such	strikingly	similar	ways. The tendency to	describe	attention in terms	of centrality	and	peripherality,	or	equivalent	terms,	seems	to	be	one	that	endures	while	time, place,	and	theoretical	background	vary,	and	most	charitable	explanation	of	that	convergence is that these theorists are just getting at something right about the phenomenology of attention. Finally, while intuitive descriptions of the effect of perceptual attention on consciousness are more common than intuitive descriptions of the effect of intellectual attention	on	consciousness,	it	would	be	surprising	if	attention	turned	out	to	have	radically different effects on the centrality of a cognitive experience as opposed to a perceptual experience. The field of consciousness is composed of both perceptual and cognitive experiences,	and	attention	seems	to	make	experiences	more	central	in	the	field	as	a	whole rather than	more	central just	with	respect to	experiences	of the	same	variety (cognitive	or perceptual). §6.	Conclusion In	this	paper,	I've	made	some	headway	on	the	question	of	what,	in	various	contexts, occupies	the	centre	of	a	field	of	experiences.	In	so	doing,	I've	shown	that	understanding	the notion	of	the	"centre"	of	a	field	of	experiences	in	purely	introspective	terms	leads	to	some methodological troubles. Then I used some behavioral evidence in favour of one	way of 27 answering the question. As I've pointed out above, there remain a variety of open and interesting	questions	about	the	ways	that	intellectual	attention	and	cognitive	consciousness interact.	For	example,	is	there	a	cognitive	analogue	to	James's	and	Fechner's	question	about whether	perceptual	attention	alters	perceptual	consciousness	in	a	non-structural	sense?	And if	so,	how	should	we	answer	it? Moreover, in investigating whether cognitive experience is structured into foreground	and	background,	I've	only	begun	the	investigation	into	all	the	ways	it	might	be structured:	according	to	James's	introspective	observations,	attention	structures	our	fields of consciousness in a wide variety of ways other than "foreground and background" including, for	example, "accent	and	emphasis, light	and	shade".	(James	1890	p.	402).	This paper provides a foundation for the investigation of further questions about accent, emphasis,	light,	and	shade	in	conscious	cognition	that	are	suggested	by	James's	remarks,	as well	for	doing	the	conceptual	work	required	to	fully	understand	the	additional	ways	in	which his remarks	suggest that there is	more to	phenomenal structure than the "peripheral-to" relation. References Anderson,	B.	(2011).	"There	is	no	such	thing	as	attention".	Frontiers	in	Psychology.	246:	1-8. Astle,	D.,	Summerfield,	J.,	Griffin,	I.,	Nobre,	A.	(2012).	"Orienting	attention	to	locations	in mental	representations".	Attention,	Perception,	and	Psychophysics.	74:146–162 Backer,	K.,	and	Alain,	C.	(2013)	"Attention	to	memory:	orienting	attention	to	sound	object representations"	Psychological	Research.	78	(3):	439-452 Bayne,	T.	(2010).	The	Unity	of	Consciousness.	Oxford	University	Press. Beck,	J.	(2012).	"The	Generality	Constraint	and	the	Structure	of	Thought".	Mind.	121:	563600. Beck,	J.	(2017).	"Marking	the	Perception–Cognition	Boundary:	The	Criterion	of	StimulusDependence".	Australasian	Journal	of	Philosophy.	DOI:	10.1080/00048402.2017.1329329 Block,	N.	(1995).	"On	a	Confusion	about	a	Function	of	Consciousness".	Behavioral	and	Brain Sciences.	18:	227-47. Burge,	T.	(2010).	Origins	of	Objectivity.	Oxford	University	Press. 28 Camp, E. (2009). "Putting Thoughts to Work: Concepts, Systematicity, and StimulusIndependence".	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research.	78(2):	275–311. Chen,	Z.	and	Cowan,	N.	(2009).	"How	verbal	memory	loads	consume	attention".	Memory	& Cognition.	37(6):	829–836. Chudnoff,	E.	(2013).	"Awareness	of	abstract	objects".	Nous.	47(4):	706-726. Chun,	M.,	Golomb,	J.,	and	Turk-Browne,	N.	(2011).	"A	taxonomy	of	external	and	internal attention".	Annual	review	of	psychology.	62:	73–101. De	Brigard,	F.	(2010).	"Attention,	consciousness,	and	commonsense".	Journal	of Consciousness	Studies.	9-10:	189–201. Evans,	C.	O.	(1970)	The	Subject	of	Consciousness.	George	Allen	&	Unwin	Ltd. Garavan,	H.	(1998).	"Serial	attention	within	working	memory".	Memory	&	Cognition.	26(2): 263-276. Heavey,	C.	L.,	Hurlburt,	R.	T.,	and	Lefforge,	N.	(2010).	"Descriptive	experience	sampling: Exploring	moments	of	inner	experience".	Qualitative	Research	in	Psychology,	7:	345-368. Higgins,	J.	and	Johnson,	M.	(2009).	"The	consequence	of	refreshing	for	access	to nonselected	items	in	young	and	older	adults".	Memory	&	Cognition.	37(2):164–174. James,	W.	(1890).	The	Principles	of	Psychology.	Harvard	University	Press. Jennings,	C.D.	(2015).	"Consciousness	without	Attention".	Journal	of	the	American Philosophical	Association.	1(2):	276–295. Johnson,	M.	K,	Reeder,	J.,	Raye,	C.,	and	Mitchell,	K.	(2002).	"Second	thoughts	versus	second looks:	an	age-related	deficit	in	reflectively	refreshing	just-activated	information". Psychological	Science.	13(1):	64–67. Johnson,	M.	R.,	Higgins,	J.,	Norman,	K.,	Sederberg,	P.,	Smith,	T.,	and	Johnson,	M.	K.	(2013). "Foraging	for	thought:	an	inhibition	of	return-like	effect	resulting	from	directing	attention within	working	memory".	Psychological	Science.	24(7):	1104–1112. Johnson,	M.K.,	Raye,	C.,	Mitchell,	K.,	Greene,	J.,	Cunningham,	W.,	Sanislow,	C.	(2005).	"Using fMRI	to	investigate	a	component	process	of	reflection:	prefrontal	correlates	of	refreshing	a just-activated	representation".	Cognitive,	Affective,	&	Behavioral	Neuroscience.	5(3):	339– 361. Raye,	C.,	Johnson,	M.,	Mitchell,	K.,	Reeder,	J.,	and	Greene,	E.	(2002).	"Neuroimaging	a	single thought:	dorsolateral	PFC	activity	associated	with	refreshing	just-activated	information". 29 NeuroImage.	15(2):447–453. Kentridge,	R.	(2011).	"Attention	without	Awareness:	A	brief	review".	In	Mole,	Wu,	and Smithies	(Eds),	Attention:	Philosophical	and	Psychological	Essays.	Oxford	University	Press. Macpherson,	F.	(2012).	"Cognitive	Penetration	of	Colour	Experience:	Rethinking	the	Issue in	Light	of	an	Indirect	Mechanism".	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research,	84:	24–62. Maher,	M.	(1923).	Psychology:	Empirical	and	Rational.	Longman,	Greens,	and	Co. Martin,	M.	(1997).	"The	shallows	of	the	mind".	Proceedings	of	the	Aristotelian	Society, Supplementary	Volumes,	71,	55-98. McElree,	B.	(2006).	"Accessing	recent	events".	In	B.	H.	Ross	(ed.),	The	psychology	of	learning and	motivation.	Academic	Press. Mole,	C.	(2008).	"Attention	and	consciousness".	Consciousness	Studies.	4(15):	86–104. Mole,	C.	(2014).	"Attention	to	Unseen	Objects".	Journal	of	Consciousness	Studies,	21(1112):41-56. Norman,	L.,	Heywood,	C.,	and	Kentridge,	R.	(2013).	"Object-Based	Attention	Without Awareness".	Psychological	Science	.	24	(5):	836-843. Phillips,	I.	(2012).	"Attention	to	the	passage	of	time".	Philosophical	Perspectives,	26,	277308. Pillsbury,	D.	(1907).	Readings	in	General	Psychology.	Cambridge	University	Press. Pitt,	D.	(2004).	"The	phenomenology	of	cognition:	or	what	is	it	like	to	think	that	p?" Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research.	1:	1–36. Schwitzgebel	,	E.	(2004).	"Introspective	Training	Apprehensively	Defended:	Reflections	on Titchener's	Lab	Manual".	Journal	of	Consciousness	Studies.	11(7-8):	58-76 Schwitzgebel,	E.	(2008).	"The	unreliability	of	naive	introspection".	The	Philosophical Review.	117(2):	245–273. Smithies,	D.	(2013).	"The	nature	of	cognitive	phenomenology".	Philosophy	Compass.	8:	744– 754. Squire,	L.	(2009).	"The	Legacy	of	Patient	H.	M.	for	Neuroscience".	Neuron	61(1):	6-9. Tye,	M.,	and	Wright,	B.	(2011).	"Is	there	a	phenomenology	of	thought?"	In	T.	Bayne	and	M. Montague	(Eds.),	Cognitive	phenomenology.	Oxford	University	Press. 30 Watzl,	S.	(2010).	The	Significance	of	Attention.	PhD	Thesis,	Columbia. Watzl,	S.	(2011a).	"Attention	as	structuring	of	the	stream	of	consciousness".	In	Christopher Mole,	Declan	Smithies,	and	Wayne	Wu	(eds.),	Attention:	Philosophical	and	Psychological Essays.	Oxford	University	Press. Watzl,	S.	(2011b).	"The	Nature	of	Attention".	Philosophy	Compass	6(11):	842-853. Watzl,	S.	(2014).	"Attentional	Organization	and	the	Unity	of	Consciousness".	Journal	of Consciousness	Studies,	21,	56-87. Watzl,	S.	2017.	Structuring	Mind.	Oxford	University	Press. Watzl,	S.	(forthcoming).	"Can	Representationism	Explain	How	Attention	Affects Appearances?".	In	Adam	Pautz	&	Daniel	Stoljar	(eds.),	Themes	from	Block.	MIT	Press Wu,	W.	(2014).	Attention.	Routledge.